by Danica Fink-Hafner

“The institutional opportunity structure for lobbying in Slovenia is not only determined by parliamentary  constitutional choice and a proportional electoral system […], but also some institutional veto points. Among the most critical institutionally determined veto points are the National Council’s suspending veto which can order the National Assembly to revote on a decision concerning a piece of legislation that has been passed; however, in order for a law to be adopted, a majority of all members of the National Assembly is required (unless the Constitution stipulates that a higher number of votes is required for the particular law in question).

Among the veto points in the political system useful for influencing the strategies of interest groups (besides convincing the National Council to use its ‘veto’) are the various kinds of referenda. The legislative referendum is particularly applicable to interest groups, but needs to be initiated before the law is decreed. Interest groups may also demand a national referendum in order to prevent a particular law from being enacted.

It is no surprise that interest groups tend to consider the executive their most important lobbying target; more precisely they contact persons who prepare policy proposals, relevant officials in ministries, working bodies
within ministries, and, to some extent, also ministers and the Prime Minister”

(from chapter 28, on the lobbying industry in Slovenia)

Leave a comment

Your email address will not be published.